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The Little India Riot: Domestic and International Law Perspectives 
 
* Chen Siyuan 
  
I. Background 
 
Migrants are not commodities nor are they just economic or 
political actors. They are producers and drivers of societal change. 
Throughout the world migrants are best placed to contribute to 
society when their rights are respected … Human beings are now 
recognised as being at the core of migration, no longer seen as 
merely economic agents.  It is only through the protection and 
respect of the human rights of all migrants that migrant workers 
are able to contribute to the economic, social and human 
development of both their countries of origin and host countries.
1
 
 
On the night of 8 December 2013, a riot broke out in Little India, Singapore. The riot 
was preceded by a fatal traffic accident involving an Indian national, and escalated 
when police and civil defence personnel who arrived on the scene were attacked by 
the rioters,
2
 some of whom were allegedly intoxicated.
3
 More than 300 Indian 
nationals – a relatively small group out of the many foreign labourers4 who were 
typically spending their day of rest in the enclave that day – were involved in the riot, 
which lasted around two hours.
5
 25 police and emergency vehicles were also badly 
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1
  ‘Statement by Committee on Migrant Workers on Migrant Workers’ Rights: 10 Years of Progress 
but Huge Challenges Remain’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 4 July 2013) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13502&LangID=E> 
accessed 31 October 2014. See also ‘Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Including Ways 
and Means to Promote the Human Rights of Migrants’ (United Nations General Assembly, 9 
August 2013) <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/292> accessed 31 
October 2014. 
2
  P S Hoe, ‘Little India Riot: Police Provide Timeline of Events on Sunday Night’ The Straits Times 
(Singapore, 10 December 2013) <http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-
news/singapore/story/little-india-riot-police-provide-timeline-events-sunday-night-20131210> 
accessed 31 October 2014. 
3
  J Heng, ‘Little India Riot: Complete Ban on Alcohol in Race Course Road Area this Coming 
Weekend’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 9 December 2013) <http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-
story/little-india-riot/story/little-india-riot-complete-ban-alcohol-race-course-road-area-c> 
accessed 31 October 2014. 
4
  The island city-state of Singapore, with one of the world’s highest GDPs per capita (‘Country 
Comparison: GDP Per Capita (PPP)’ (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013) 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html> accessed 
31 October 2014), relies heavily on foreign labour for a variety of purposes. Hundreds of 
thousands of nationals from countries such as India, Bangladesh, and China work in the 
construction industry: ‘Foreign Workforce Numbers’ (Ministry of Manpower, 14 November 2013) 
<http://www.mom.gov.sg/statistics-
publications/others/statistics/Pages/ForeignWorkforceNumbers.aspx> accessed 31 October 2014.  
5
  See note 2 above. 
2 
 
damaged or destroyed in the process, while 39 police and civil defence personnel 
were injured, with some having to be hospitalised.
6
  
 
Notably, this was only the second riot in more than 40 years in fairly tranquil 
Singapore,
7
 and special operations and Gurkha forces had to be deployed to quell the 
riot.
8
 Though rioting does not attract the harshest of punishments under Singapore 
law – the sentence for a convicted rioter is an imprisonment term for up to 7 years 
and caning
9
 – the scale of the riot meant that the incident dominated the local news 
for weeks. The Prime Minister even appointed a four-member Committee of Inquiry 
to investigate the incident and to prepare a detailed report within six months.
10
 
Restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol in Little India were also 
imposed.
11
 At the same time, the police began questioning more than 4000 foreign 
labourers, of which 400 were further investigated.
12
 Of the latter, 200 were issued 
‘advisories’ to comply with Singapore laws, 28 were charged with rioting,13 and 57 
                                                 
6
  Y L Lim, ‘Little India Riot: Injured SCDF and Police Officers have been Discharged from 
Hospital’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 9 December 2013) <http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-
story/little-india-riot/story/little-india-riot-injured-scdf-and-police-officers-have-been-d> accessed 
31 October 2014. 
7
  E Torrijos, ‘Deceased Foreign Worker in Little India Riot Tripped and Fell after being Ejected 
from Bus: Police’ (Yahoo! News Singapore, 8 December 2013) <http://sg.news.yahoo.com/fire--
rioting-taking-place-in-little-india--reports-152651999.html> accessed 31 October 2014. Earlier in 
the year, 29 public bus drivers from China were also repatriated after they had participated in an 
illegal strike. 
8
  See note 2 above. 
9
  Section 147 of Penal Code (Chapter 224, Revised Edition 2008). The first rioter who was 
subsequently convicted – he had pleaded guilty – was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and 
three strokes of the cane: Y L Lim, ‘2 ½ Years’ Jail and Caning for Little India Rioter’ The Straits 
Times (Singapore, 8 May 2014) <http://www.straitstimes.com/news/singapore/courts-
crime/story/first-man-convicted-rioting-little-india-dec-8-given-30-months-jai> accessed 31 
October 2014. Notably, a subsequent prosecution of another rioter – who had removed concrete 
from a kerb and hurled pieces of it at the police, rescue personnel, and their vehicles – was 
sentenced to 25 months’ imprisonment with no caning. 
10
  M Almenoar, ‘Little India Riot: Committee of Inquiry into Riot Appointed; to Look into Various 
Areas’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 13 December 2013) <http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-
story/little-india-riot/story/little-india-riot-committee-inquiry-riot-appointed-look-variou> 
accessed 31 October 2014. Previously, Committees of Inquiry had been set up to look into high-
profile incidents such as the Nicholl Highway collapse (2004) and the escape of suspected terrorist 
Mas Selamat bin Kastari (2008). 
11
  W Sim, ‘Alcohol Consumption in Public Areas of Little India Remains Banned on Weekends’ The 
Straits Times (Singapore, 18 December 2013) <http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/little-
india-riot/story/alcohol-consumption-public-areas-little-india-remains-banned-w> accessed 31 
October 2014. 
12
  L Lai, ‘Law Allows Minister to Decide Who is Deported’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 22 
December 2013) <http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/singapore/story/law-allows-
minister-decide-who-deported-20131222> accessed 31 October 2014. 
13
  26 of them were assigned pro bono counsel by the Law Society of Singapore: ‘Little India Riot: 
Pro Bono Defence Counsel Assigned for 26 of the 28 Workers Charged’ The Straits Times 
(Singapore, 18 December 2013) <http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/little-india-
riot/story/little-india-riot-pro-bono-defence-counsel-assigned-26-the-28-> accessed 31 October 
2014. Charges were subsequently withdrawn against three individuals: ‘Little India Riot: Charges 
against Three Alleged Rioters Withdrawn’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 23 December 2013) 
<http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/singapore/story/little-india-riot-charges-against-
3 
 
were repatriated on the basis that they posed a threat to the safety and security of 
Singapore.
14
  
 
With respect to the repatriated individuals in particular, international and local 
human rights groups criticised the Singapore government for a lack of public 
accountability and transparency, a lack of due process, and arbitrary deportation.
15
 
There was also no indication that the repatriated workers had any opportunity to 
engage legal representation and/or appeal the decision of repatriation. In response, 
the Singapore government said that the repatriation of foreigners is an executive act 
by the Minister for Home Affairs that is legally permissible under the Immigration 
Act,
16
 and that any right to due process has to be balanced against the rights of 
Singaporeans to live in a safe environment.
17
 It also said that while persons who have 
been charged with crimes have a right to due judicial process, foreign nationals 
subject to repatriation cannot challenge repatriation orders, which is also the practice 
of other jurisdictions such as Australia, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom.
18
 
Finally, it pointed out that ‘one of the conditions under which foreign nationals are 
allowed the privilege to come here to work is that they can be repatriated if, for 
example, the Minister assesses them to be security threats … If a court process had 
been necessary before they are repatriated, they could have stayed on in Singapore 
for a considerable period.’19 In other words, prolonging their stay would result in the 
incurring of unnecessary (public) costs and security risks (though this was not 
mentioned, if any individual had been unduly detained while a repatriation decision 
was pending, this could have had certain international legal ramifications as well).
20
 
 
According to the Singapore government, about 13,000 foreigners have been 
repatriated annually over the past three years;
21
 deportees include illegal immigrants, 
                                                                                                                                          
three-alleged-rioters-withdrawn-2013> accessed 31 October 2014. As of August 2014, 15 of them 
have been convicted. 
14
  See note 12 above. 
15
  Ibid. Notably, however, the International Organisation for Migration has not released any 
comment on the incident. 
16
  (Chapter 133, Revised Edition 2008). 
17
  See note 12 above. 
18
  Ibid. These examples were cited presumably because there are large numbers of migrant workers 
there as well. In neighbouring Malaysia, its Immigration Act 1959/63 (Act 155) also has 
provisions that clearly give the Executive a broad range of powers to control immigration inflow 
and outflow, including the expedient removal of foreigners who are no longer entitled to remain in 
the country.  
19
  ‘Ministry of Law’s Statement on the Repatriation of Foreign Workers’ (Ministry of Law, 21 
December 2013) <http://www.mlaw.gov.sg/news/replies/statement-on-the-repatriation-of-foreign-
workers.html> accessed 31 October 2014. 
20
  See generally D Wilsher, ‘The Administrative Detention of Non-Nationals Pursuant to 
Immigration Control: International and Constitutional Law Perspectives’ (2004) 53(4) 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 897. 
21
  This is, presumably, different from the (private, as opposed to public) situation where employers 
or agencies (rather than the government) ‘send home’ foreign workers of a different sort – 
domestic helpers – before their contracts expire. These numbers would, however, probably include 
foreign nationals who did not obtain proper work permits in the first place. 
4 
 
over-stayers and those with work privileges cancelled.
22
 The Little India riot has now 
brought into question – perhaps prominently for the first time – the legality of the 
repatriation regime in Singapore, specifically with regard to foreign nationals who 
have been and are being deported without judicial process but on the basis of 
executive imperative.
23
 Given the widespread controversy that the repatriation of the 
Little India rioters has generated, the aim of this article is to briefly determine the 
domestic legal framework that is used for such repatriation in Singapore, and (given 
the international dimension of the issue) to see whether it is compatible with 
Singapore’s obligations under the burgeoning international legal framework for 
migrant rights.
24
  
 
II. The Domestic Legal Framework 
 
A. Basis for Repatriation 
 
In repatriating the foreign labourers, the Singapore government alluded to the 
Immigration Act, but it is unclear which particular aspect of it was relied upon. There 
is no provision in the statute that uses the terms ‘deport’ or ‘deportation’,25 and of the 
four provisions that make references to the term ‘repatriate’ or ‘repatriation’,26 none 
of them are directly relevant here.
27
 There are, however, seven provisions under Part 
V of the statute (entitled ‘Removal from Singapore’) that state how foreign nationals 
may be removed from the country. Of interest here would be s 32, which states that 
foreign nationals who are convicted of an offence under ss 5, 6, 8, or 9 of the 
Immigration Act shall be liable to be removed from Singapore by order of the 
                                                 
22
  C C Neo, ‘Little India Riot: Four More Workers Deported’ Today (Singapore, 21 December 2013) 
<http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/little-india-riot-four-more-workers-deported> accessed 
31 October 2014. 
23
  Although sympathy should be accorded to the fact that migrant labourers often incur great 
financial debt just to have a chance to work in another country and when they do arrive in the 
country they have to work in fairly harsh working conditions, this should not – contrary to what 
many supposed rights advocates have done – colour the analysis of whether a state can, on the 
ground of genuine national security considerations, remove foreign nationals from its territory. 
These are separate issues that cannot be conflated; to do so would be to assume that anyone who is 
economically exploited is justified in turning to crime to make a point (or cannot help but do so). 
24
  The following questions come to mind in identifying the frameworks: (1) what is the source of the 
power to repatriate; (2) what triggers repatriation; (3) are there any procedural and/or substantive 
protections for people who are to be repatriated; (4) is there a review mechanism for the 
repatriation decision; and (5) must such people be subject to the judicial process or can they be 
dealt with solely under the an executive process? 
25
  The term ‘expelled’ appears in s 53, but that provision is not relevant here. 
26
  To be clear, this article focuses on the more specific act of repatriation (sending a foreign national 
back to his country of origin) rather than the more general act of deportation (removing a foreign 
national from the country). 
27
  Section 8(3)(l) is about persons with repatriation records; s 43 is about the discharge of seamen; s 
45 is about voluntary repatriation; and s 47A is about seizure of moneys for the purpose of 
repatriation. In terms of applicable subsidiary legislation, there are references to repatriation in the 
Immigration Regulations (see regs 9 and 24) and the Employment of Foreign Manpower (Work 
Passes) Regulations (see regs 6–8 and 10), but again, none of them are directly relevant here. 
5 
 
Controller (of Immigration).
28
 Then there is s 33(1), which states that foreign 
nationals whose presence in Singapore are unlawful by reason of ss 15 or 62 of the 
Immigration Act ‘shall, whether or not any proceedings are taken against him in 
respect of any offence under that section, be liable to be removed from Singapore by 
order of the Controller.’ 
 
Since this article is concerned with the foreign nationals who were repatriated 
without being subject to any judicial process, it is only s 33 that warrants further 
examination here. Section 33 refers to s 15; specifically, subsection (1) states that 
foreign nationals ‘shall not remain in Singapore after the cancellation of any [entry] 
permit or certificate [of status]’.29 Section 33 also refers to s 62; specifically, 
subsection (1) states that foreign nationals whose presence are ‘unlawful under the 
provisions of any previous written law for the time being in force in Singapore or any 
regulations or orders made thereunder shall be deemed to be unlawfully in 
Singapore’. Thus, the repatriation of the 57 foreign nationals was, in all likelihood, 
done pursuant to s 33 of the Immigration Act, and presumably after their work 
permits were cancelled on the basis that they had breached an employment condition 
in their work contracts not to run afoul of the law.
30
 It is also clear that an application 
of s 33 is a power that is exercised by the Executive arm of government, rooted in the 
assumption that a decision of this nature requires the weighing of competing policy 
considerations (and is thus more amenable to executive, rather than judicial decision 
and scrutiny).
31
 
 
B. Relevant Rights 
 
But the repatriated foreign nationals would have had certain rights under existing 
local laws. For instance, in terms of the possibility of appealing against the 
repatriation decision, s 33(2) of the Immigration Act states that foreign nationals who 
                                                 
28
  Under s 8(3)(i) read with s 8(1) of the Immigration Act, any foreign national ‘who believes in or 
advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the Government or … who disbelieves in or is 
opposed to established government … or who advocates or teaches the unlawful destruction of 
property’ is a prohibited immigrant. Under s 9(1)(a), the Minister for Home Affairs may ‘by 
order where he thinks it expedient to do so in the interests of public security or by reason of any 
economic, industrial, social, educational or other conditions in Singapore prohibit, either for a 
stated period or permanently, the entry or re-entry into Singapore of any person or class of persons 
[or] limit the period during which any person or class of persons entering or re-entering Singapore 
may remain therein’. 
29
  Read with s 2 of the Immigration Act. 
30
  See also Karuppah Alagu v The Minister of Home Affairs [1992] SGHC 72, where the Singapore 
High Court held that for proceedings pursuant to ss 33–35 of the Immigration Act, the court is ‘not 
concerned with the guilt or innocence of the detainees’ but only that the evidence shows that 
detention is lawful. These heads, in turn, comprise grounds such as ultra vires acts, improper 
exercise of discretion, and breach of natural justice. 
31
  See Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 947 at para 19: ‘Case law 
would thus have identified certain hallmarks that, historically or jurisprudentially, would 
distinguish the judicial power from the legislative power and the executive power. Such a 
distinction is essential to separate one constitutional power from the other constitutional powers 
functionally. This is important as the principle of separation of powers requires that each 
constitutional organ should act within the limits of its own powers … This total separation … is 
based on the rule of law’. 
6 
 
have been ordered to be removed under s 33(1) ‘may appeal to the Minister [for 
Home Affairs] in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed.’32 On the 
other hand, s 39A(1) of the same statute states that there shall be ‘no judicial review 
in any court of any … decision made by the Minister or the Controller under any 
provision of this Act except in regard to any question relating to compliance with any 
procedural requirement of this Act or the regulations governing that … decision.’33 
However, unless there is evidence that the Minister will not give the appellant a fair 
hearing (for the purposes of s 33(2)), there can only be recourse to judicial review 
after an appeal to the Minister has been made.
34
 This is otherwise known as the 
requirement to exhaust possible alternative remedies.
35
  
 
With respect to legal representation,
36
 art 9(3) of the Constitution
37
 states that ‘Where 
a person is arrested, he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his 
arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his 
choice.’38 However, there are several limitations and/or nuances to this right that 
should be noted. First, art 9(5) of the Constitution states that arts 9(3) and 9(4) ‘shall 
not apply to an enemy alien’. Secondly, there is no legal obligation on the part of the 
relevant authorities to inform the accused person of this constitutional right.
39
 
Thirdly, the right does not arise immediately after arrest and is not violated as long as 
                                                 
32
  However, the Singapore High Court held in Re Siah Mooi Guat [1988] 2 SLR(R) 165 at para 31 
that aliens given leave to enter the country for a limited period have no right to stay and no 
legitimate expectation of being allowed to stay beyond the permitted period, and the rules of 
natural justice do not apply and the extension of stays of aliens can be refused without reasons and 
without any hearing. But for the latest development on legitimate expectation, see Chiu Teng @ 
Kallang Pte Ltd v Singapore Land Authority [2013] SGHC 262 at para 117.  
33
  This restriction of judicial review needs to be seen in the light of the three broad heads of judicial 
review (illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety) as established in the seminal House of 
Lords decision in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 
at 410. 
34
  Borissik Svetlana v Urban Redevelopment Authority [2009] 4 SLR(R) 92 at paras 25–30. 
35
  An applicant seeking judicial review must also meet three conditions for leave to be granted: the 
subject matter must be susceptible to judicial review; the applicant has locus standi in the matter; 
and the material before the court discloses an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion 
in favour of granting the remedies sought by the applicant (Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v 
Attorney-General [2013] SGCA 56 at para 5). 
36
  Accused persons who cannot afford legal counsel may avail themselves of criminal defence 
lawyers working pro bono. Under the Pro Bono Services Office of the Law Society of Singapore, 
there is the Criminal Legal Aid Scheme which offers free legal representation for accused persons 
who claim trial in non-capital cases. Volunteers comprise Advocates & Solicitors who have a 
practicing certificate in Singapore. 
37
  (1985 Revised Edition, 1999 Reprint). 
38
  Article 9(4) then states that ‘Where a person is arrested and not released, he shall, without 
unreasonable delay, and in any case within 48 hours (excluding the time of any necessary 
journey), be produced before a Magistrate, in person or by way of video-conferencing link (or 
other similar technology) in accordance with law, and shall not be further detained in custody 
without the Magistrate’s authority.’ 
39
  Rajeevan Edakalavan v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 10 at para 21; Sun Hongyu v Public 
Prosecutor [2005] 2 SLR(R) 750 at para 34. See also Public Prosecutor v Mazlan bin Maidun 
[1992] 3 SLR(R) 968 at paras 15–19. 
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it arises within a reasonable time after arrest.
40
 Fourthly, the authorities are not 
legally obligated to permit counsel to be present while investigations are being 
carried out.
41
 Fifthly, if counsel fails to turn up, the accused cannot by virtue of this 
fact alone claim that his constitutional right has been violated.
42
 Sixthly, it is possible 
for the accused person to waive the right to counsel.
43
 Notwithstanding all of this, the 
right to counsel is not stated in the Constitution to be limited only to nationals (unless 
art 9(4) applies).  
 
A possible issue here, though, is that the repatriated nationals may not even have 
been arrested (which is different from merely being questioned or even investigated) 
by the police to trigger the constitutional right. What is categorically known, 
however, is that the police had administered stern warnings
44
 to the individuals 
before they were repatriated.
45
 In other words, the police
46
 must have considered that 
there was not enough evidence to proceed with prosecution, but at the same time, the 
repatriated individuals would likely have agreed to accept the stern warnings and 
their terms – which in effect is to admit to some form of guilt,47 albeit without the 
legal consequence following conviction – in lieu of prosecution.48 Thus, while these 
individuals were ‘spared’ the (undoubtedly unpleasant) prospect of prosecution on 
the one hand (though of course an acquittal or even discharge was always possible 
had they proceeded to prosecution, in which case repatriation would have been the 
harsher prospect), the need for the prosecutor to spend time and resources (both of 
which, it should be remembered, are taxpayer-paid) to gather sufficient evidence to 
meet the criminal standard of proof to justify prosecuting these individuals was 
                                                 
40
  Lee Mau Seng v Minister of Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at paras 14–17; Public 
Prosecutor v Leong Siew Chor [2006] SGCA 38 at para 9. 
41
  Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at para 57. 
42
  Balasundram s/o Suppiah v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 SLR(R) 853 at para 11. 
43
  Tan Chor Jin v Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 306 at paras 49–73. 
44
  For the general purpose of stern warnings, see Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 
476 at para 183. 
45
  D Loh, ‘Little India Riot: Four More to be Deported, 53 Repatriated’ (Channel NewsAsia, 20 
December 2013) <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/little-india-riot-
four/929378.html> accessed 31 October 2014. Although only the Attorney-General is 
constitutionally mandated (under art 35(8)) to decide on prosecutorial matters, he is permitted to 
delegate functions and powers (s 11 of Criminal Procedure Code (Chapter 68, Revised Edition 
2012)). For a discourse on prosecutorial discretion in Singapore, see S Y Chen, ‘The Limits on 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Singapore: Past, Present, and Future’ (2013) 2(1) International Review 
of Law 1. 
46
  This was probably done in consultation with the Attorney-General’s Chambers, given that 
prosecution was indeed initiated (by the Attorney-General’s Chambers) against some of the 
foreign labourers. 
47
  For a discourse on the right to presumption of innocence in Singapore, see S Y Chen, ‘A 
Preliminary Survey of the Right to Presumption of Innocence in Singapore’ (2012) 7 LAWASIA 
Journal 78. It should be noted that being denied the prosecutorial process would also mean that 
another right – the right to bail – does not arise. Whether a right to bail would be granted would of 
course depend on the nature and seriousness of the offence. 
48
  See H J Tan, ‘Be Warned of the Stern Warning’ (September, 2013) Singapore Law Gazette. 
8 
 
obviated on the other hand.
49
 Be that as it may, there appears to be a need for 
clarification as to the practical and legal implications of stern warnings. 
 
Parenthetically, it should also be noted that of the 57 repatriated, three of them were 
almost subject to a full trial, but were granted discharges amounting to acquittals (as 
opposed to discharges not amounting to acquittals)
50
 after the prosecution chose not 
to proceed with the matter in court.
51
 These individuals were repatriated all the same, 
presumably also after accepting the stern warnings from the police. The subject of 
whether an acquittal in Singapore amounts to an accused person being merely legally 
innocent but not factually innocent was just debated in Singapore not too long ago.
52
 
What is key here is that while a discharge amounting to an acquittal will act as a bar 
to re-prosecuting the individual in question for the same offence based on the same 
facts,
53
 it may not necessarily act as a bar to repatriation if that individual is a foreign 
national. At least in terms of case law, there is nothing that says it will act as a bar. 
Ultimately, the question reverts to the appropriate limits of a state’s exercise of its 
executive powers. But in so far as the three who were charged must have been 
arrested at some point, was their right to counsel abrogated in some way?  
 
Then there may be a question of discrimination or unequal treatment. Art 12(1) of the 
Constitution states that ‘All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal 
protection of the law’.54 An obvious but fundamental hurdle is that Singapore 
nationals, unlike foreign nationals, by definition, cannot be repatriated; the only class 
of individuals that faces the prospect of repatriation (with or without judicial process) 
would be foreign nationals, and therefore comparisons of equal treatment can only be 
made within that particular class.
55
 Indeed, the settled jurisprudence in Singapore is 
that ‘the concept of equality does not mean that all persons are to be treated equally, 
but simply that all persons in like situations will be treated alike.’56 In addition, 
recent jurisprudence suggests that the legal burden of proof is on the individual to 
adduce evidence that the government has violated art 12 by acting arbitrarily or 
pursuant to an extraneous purpose, and until this is done, the government is not 
obligated to furnish any reason for acting the way it did.
57
 Given these constraints, an 
                                                 
49
  The criminal standard of proof in Singapore is beyond a reasonable doubt: J Pinsler, Evidence and 
the Litigation Process (2nd ed, LexisNexis, 2010), pp 437–442. 
50
  The latter leaves open the possibility of prosecution in the future: Yunani bin Abdul Hamid v 
Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 383 at paras 11–19.  
51
  See note 13 above. 
52
  See note 47 above at 79. 
53
  This was accepted by Parliament by the Minister for Law: Singapore Parliament Reports, Vol 
84(17), 25 August 2008 (Mr K Shanmugam). 
54
  Art 12(2) further states that only Singapore citizens are protected from discrimination on the 
ground of religion, race, descent, or place of birth in any law establishing or carrying on of any 
trade, business, profession, vocation, or employment. 
55
  Even in the international law context, the protection against discrimination is with respect to 
migrant workers as a class, rather than migrant workers vis-à-vis nationals of the state in question: 
art 7 of UN Migration Convention, below note 66. 
56
  Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 at para 54. See also Mohamed Emran 
bin Mohamed Ali v Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 411 at para 26. 
57
  See Chen, note 45 above at 2. 
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argument along the lines of unequal treatment is both devoid of ease of proving and 
merit. 
 
III. The International Legal Framework 
 
A. Perspective from State Sovereignty  
 
Turning then to the question of international law’s coverage of migrant worker 
rights, it has to be said at the outset that one cannot plausibly argue against the notion 
that every sovereign state, even with modern international law constraints, has a 
certain set of fundamental sovereign prerogatives. High on this list of would be (as 
borne from its territorial sovereignty) a state’s right to control its borders and to 
establish immigration and customs;
58
 concomitantly, a non-national cannot invoke a 
right to enter and remain in another state as he pleases, but on the contrary he can be 
asked to leave if the state has a reason to do so (and what constitutes a ‘reason’ will 
have to be further explored). The confluence of the development of international 
human rights law and globalisation (in this context, the proliferation of transient 
migrant labourers who often contribute significantly, even if indirectly, to the 
economic growth of their host states), however, requires state prerogatives and 
individual liberties to be constantly re-balanced against each other.
59
 At the same 
time, irrespective of the robustness of its democratic processes, every state has a 
basic duty to protect its citizens from harm by ensuring law and order, and removing 
any potentially criminal non-nationals by repatriation is an expedient route that is 
likely to appease majority segments of the citizenry.
60
 Further, from yet another 
democratic viewpoint, laws (including immigration laws) are passed by the 
legislators, who in turn represent the will of the people; laws, therefore, in theory at 
least, reflect what the majority of the people want. It is perhaps easier to justify 
seemingly harsh immigration laws from this parochial and insular view.
61
 
 
A couple of other preliminary points should also be noted in Singapore’s case. First, 
it is generally accepted that Singapore subscribes to the ‘dualist’, rather than 
‘monist’, approach in the reception of international law obligations.62 That is to say, 
Singapore rejects the notion that international law and domestic law are but parts of a 
single system, with acts of ratification immediately incorporating its international 
                                                 
58
  Indeed, one of the core requirements of statehood is that there must be effective control by a 
government. Effective control is strongly manifested in the form of border control and 
immigration laws: P Malnczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th ed, 
Routledge, 1997), pp 77–78. 
59
  ‘Migration and Human Rights: Improving Human Rights-Based Governance of International 
Migration’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/MigrationHR_improvingHR_Report.pdf> 
accessed 31 October 2014. 
60
  A Aust, Handbook of International Law (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp 221 and 
379. 
61
  See also ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, 1 June 2010) <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/MHR/E-
2010-89_en.pdf> accessed 31 October 2014. 
62
  S Y Chen, ‘The Relationship Between International Law and Domestic Law’ (2011) 23(1) 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 350 at 355–358. 
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legal obligations into domestic law.
63
 There must be an enactment of a statute that 
reflects the newly adopted international law obligations before the latter has the force 
of domestic law. Secondly, the Singapore government has long maintained that as 
between the various types of human rights, it considers the securing of economic 
rights to be the most important priority; it also considers communitarian interests 
(such as the preservation of law and order) to be paramount.
64
 Taking these two 
points together, one can probably expect Singapore to have been conservative in 
assuming any international law obligations that promote individual rights for migrant 
workers at any perceived expense of majoritarian interests (particularly those 
pertaining to the economy and public safety). 
 
B. International Law Obligations 
 
In terms of treaty or conventional law, there are quite a number of treaties that 
pertain to migrant rights,
65
 chief of which is probably the International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (‘UN Migration Convention’),66 which entered into force in 2003.67 The UN 
Migration Convention has attracted participation from 58 states thus far, with no less 
than 22 ratifications and 21 accessions.
68
 Notably, an overwhelming majority of the 
58 states are so-called developing countries,
69
 or countries that are more likely to 
have their nationals repatriated to, rather than foreign nationals repatriated from.
70
 
                                                 
63
  Ibid. One of the main justifications for adopting this position is that art 93 of the Constitution vests 
law-making powers solely in the Legislature, and not the Executive (the latter being the one 
responsible for conducting foreign affairs, including signing international legal obligations). 
64
  Singapore White Paper on Shared Values (Cmd 1, 1991) at para 52; L A Thio, ‘Singapore Human 
Rights Practice and Legal Policy: Of Pragmatism and Principle, Rights, Rhetoric and Realism’ 
(2009) 21(1) Singapore Academy of Law Journal 326 at 327–331. 
65
  Many of these are initiatives of the International Labour Organisation. For instance, there is the 
Migration for Employment Convention of 1949 (C97), but notably, art 4 states: ‘Measures shall be 
taken as appropriate by each Member, within its jurisdiction, to facilitate the departure, journey 
and reception of migrants for employment.’ Then there is also the Migrant Workers 
(Supplementary Provisions) Convention of 1975 (C143), but it is silent on migrant worker rights 
with regard to repatriation (art 9 only addresses the bearing of costs of expulsion). Neither of these 
conventions have majority ratification numbers. 
66
  2220 UNTS 3. In Europe, there is the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant 
Workers ETS No 093 (‘European Convention’). 
67
  ‘International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families’ (United Nations Treaty Collection, 31 October 2014) 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 
31 October 2014. 
68
  ‘Present State of Ratifications and Signatures of the UN Migration Convention’ (United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 2013) <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-
and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/international-migration-convention/present-
state-of-ratifications-and-signatures/> accessed 31 October 2014. The remaining 15 states have 
only signed the convention, and apart from not defeating its object and purpose, they will not be 
legally bound by the convention’s obligations: art 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 1155 UNTS 331. 
69
  See ‘Developing Countries’ (The International Statistical Institute, 2013) <http://www.isi-
web.org/component/content/article/5-root/root/81-developing> accessed 31 October 2014. 
70
  ‘Press Conference by Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants’ (United Nations, 3 
October 2013) <http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2013/131003_Migrants.doc.htm> 
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Given that Singapore is considered a developed country with one of the world’s 
highest per capita GDPs, and that its current total foreign workforce numbers 1.3 
million
71
 – or roughly a quarter of its population72 – it should not be surprising that it 
is not a state party to the convention (nor is it a state party to any other convention 
relating specifically to migrant workers).
73
 Prima facie, it is also unlikely to be 
(generally) bound by the UN Migration Convention by virtue of customary 
international law, given the convention’s relatively low and interest-driven take-up 
rate at this point in time.
74
 That having been said, the purported purpose behind the 
UN Migration Convention was not to create new human rights obligations; rather, it 
was meant to consolidate, replicate, and limitedly extend certain fundamental human 
rights found in various core human rights instruments
75
 such as the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
76
 and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’),77 though of course the convention also has 
specific provisions pertaining to migrant worker-specific issues such as 
remuneration, conditions of work, employment benefits, and regularisation. The 
following articles of the UN Migration Convention, re-expressed for the migrant 
worker context, are the most pertinent for consideration here:
78
 
 
Art 20
79
 
… 
2.  No migrant worker … shall be deprived of his or her 
authorisation of residence or work permit or expelled merely on the 
ground of failure to fulfil an obligation arising out of a work 
                                                                                                                                          
accessed 31 October 2014. See also R Cholewinski, P de Guchteniere, and A Pecoud (eds), 
Migration and Human Rights: The United Nations Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights 
(Cambridge University Press and UNESCO, 2010). 
71
  See note 4 above. 
72
  ‘Population & Land Area’ (Department of Statistics Singapore, 2013) 
<http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/latest_data.html#14> accessed 31 October 2014. 
73
  ‘International Labour Standards on Migrant Workers’ (International Labour Organisation, 2013) 
<http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/migrant-
workers/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 31 October 2014. 
74
  It is trite law that for an international norm to acquire the status of customary international law, 
there must be widespread and consistent state practice coupled with opinio juris, and that 
multilateral treaties may evidence this: M Shaw, International Law (6th ed, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), p 73. 
75
  See note 1 above. 
76
  993 UNTS 3. 
77
  999 UNTS 171. 
78
  The following articles are found in Part III of the convention entitled ‘Human Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families’ – that is, it applies even to ‘irregular’ or 
unauthorised migrant workers. This particular part was drafted on the basis of consensus rather 
than majority voting: L Bicocchi, ‘Overview of Travaux Preparatoires of Rights of All Migrant 
Workers (Part III of the Convention)’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2005), 
p 1. 
79
  See also art 11 of the ICCPR: ‘No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to 
fulfil a contractual obligation.’ 
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contract unless fulfilment of that obligation constitutes a condition 
for such authorisation or permit.
80
 
 
Art 22
81
 
 
1.  Migrant workers … shall not be subject to measures of 
collective expulsion. Each case of expulsion shall be examined and 
decided individually. 
2.  Migrant workers … may be expelled from the territory of a 
State Party only in pursuance of a decision taken by the competent 
authority in accordance with law. 
… 
4. Except where a final decision is pronounced by a judicial 
authority, the person concerned shall have the right to submit the 
reason he or she should not be expelled and to have his or her case 
reviewed by the competent authority, unless compelling reasons of 
national security require otherwise … 
 
Art 23
82
 
 
Migrant workers … shall have the right to have recourse to the 
protection and assistance of the consular or diplomatic authorities of 
their State of origin … in case of expulsion, the person concerned 
shall be informed of this right without delay and the authorities of 
the expelling State shall facilitate the exercise of such right.
83
 
 
From the above, it is quite clear that the convention, despite being the most recent 
treaty that addresses migrant worker rights, is actually rather modest in its 
protections with respect to the processes before and during repatriation – migrant 
                                                 
80
  The ‘unless’ clause was added to satisfy the American delegation during the drafting of the 
convention: note 78 above at p 4.  
81
  See also art 13 of the ICCPR: ‘An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present 
Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with 
law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed 
to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented 
for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the 
competent authority.’ 
82
  Cf art 26(2) of the European Convention: ‘Each Contracting Party shall provide migrant workers 
with legal assistance on the same conditions as for their own nationals and, in the case of civil or 
criminal proceedings, the possibility of obtaining the assistance of an interpreter where they cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court.’ 
83
  The repatriated individuals reportedly had consular access: S See, ‘53 to be Repatriated for Role in 
Little India Riot’ (Channel NewsAsia, 17 December 2013) 
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/53-to-be-repatriated-for/925418.html> 
accessed 31 October 2014. For the Court of Appeal’s comments on consular access under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 596 UNTS 261, see Nguyen Tuong Van v Public 
Prosecutor [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103 at paras 23–33. 
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workers can be expelled quite easily without much due process afforded.
84
 State 
primacy or state subjectivity and discretion is generally strong, rendering the 
question of whether the articles above have customary status (and are thereby 
binding on all states) inconsequential.
85
 Even the International Labour Organisation 
takes the position that under international labour standards, states have considerable 
discretion in formulating their repatriation laws and policies for their migrant 
workers as a result of strong state sovereignty over border control.
86
 Regionally, 
though not necessarily a legally binding instrument per se, the 2007 ASEAN 
Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers 
(‘ASEAN Declaration’)87 reflects some of the UN Migration Convention obligations 
as well, but with obvious deference to sovereign interests.
88
 Specifically, while 
receiving states have an obligation to ‘facilitate access to justice’, they need only do 
so in accordance with their own laws. Likewise, while there is an obligation to 
‘facilitate the exercise of consular or diplomatic authorities of states of origin when a 
migrant worker is arrested or committed to prison or custody or detained in any other 
manner’, they need only do in accordance with their own laws. Notably, in 2010, a 
committee was established to create a legal apparatus to give effect to the obligations 
contained in the ASEAN Declaration, but to date, nothing has materialised.
89
 
 
What about other human rights instruments? One may look at, for instance, art 14 of 
the ICCPR, which guarantees a number of obligations such as equality before a 
tribunal, a fair and public hearing by a competent and independent tribunal, right to 
counsel, trial without undue delay, the right to cross-examination, and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. However, this is only relevant if the individual in question 
has been prosecuted. The repatriation of individuals seemingly bypasses this as the 
individual is not strictly speaking, subject to criminal proceedings but executive 
action. Indeed, the acceptance of the stern warning short-circuits the criminal process 
and subjects the individual to the administrative process immediately.   
 
IV. Some Thoughts on How the Two Frameworks Compare 
 
Based on what we have learned thus far, the following observations on how the local 
and international frameworks compare can be made: 
                                                 
84
  The expulsion or repatriation of migrant workers for expiration of passes should not be confused 
with the expulsion of refugees, with the latter category of people attracting a very distinct body of 
rights and also issues such as freedom of movement, discrimination, and non-refoulement: see eg, 
C T Gunther, ‘France’s Repatriation of Roma: Violation of Fundamental Freedoms?’ (2012) 45(1) 
Cornell International Law Journal 205. 
85
  The assumption of course is that the convention probably sets a higher threshold than prevailing 
international custom. 
86
  See generally ‘International Labour Standards on Migrant Workers’ Rights’ (International Labour 
Office, 2007) <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-
bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_146244.pdf> accessed 31 October 2014. 
87
  Reproduced in (2007) 8(2) Asia-Pacific Journal of Human Rights and the Law 85. 
88
  The preamble also recognises ‘the sovereignty of states in determining their own migration policy 
relating to migrant workers, including determining entry into their territory and under which 
conditions migrant workers may remain’. 
89
  Contributing to this as well may be the fact that there are many undocumented migrant workers in 
the region (but not so in Singapore). 
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1. The UN Migration Convention is the most recent treaty pertaining to migrant 
worker rights, but Singapore is not a state party. However, in so far as the 
treaty was not designed to create new human rights obligations but to simply 
restate those obligations in the migrant worker context with some minor 
modifications, it may be possible to construe most, if not all, of its provisions 
as having the status of international custom. 
 
2. Under Singapore law and the UN Migration Convention, a migrant worker 
may not remain in his host country if the permit allowing him to stay in that 
country has been cancelled. It is permissible to cancel the permit if the work 
contract provides that a ground for cancellation is if the worker poses a 
security threat. Upon cancellation of the permit, the worker may be 
repatriated, though it is unclear as to how long more he can remain in the 
country.
90
 In this light, both domestic and international law are in favour of 
state (the Executive, specifically) primacy. It is thus not surprising that the 
Singapore government was able to assert, with some confidence, that what it 
was doing was in line with representative state practice, whether in the 
regional or global sense. 
 
3. Under Singapore law, the migrant worker may appeal the decision to 
repatriate him to the Minister for Home Affairs, and any judicial review of 
the decision is limited to its compliance with the statutory procedural 
requirements. Under the UN Migration Convention, the state is permitted to 
determine its own repatriation procedure, provided that the migrant worker is 
not subject to collective expulsion and can have his case reviewed by a 
competent authority. In this light, both domestic and international law are in 
favour of the issue being framed as an executive decision with limited review, 
and conceptualise due process in a not very substantial way (unless one 
accepts that substantial discretion in the hands of the Executive suffices). It 
can also reasonably be assumed that the repatriation of the migrant workers in 
question here was done on a case-by-case basis, so no issue of indiscriminate 
mass expulsion arises. Certainly at this point no such allegation has been 
known to be made by any of the workers who were prosecuted or repatriated. 
 
4. Under Singapore law, there is a constitutional right to counsel if a person is 
arrested. While there are various limitations to this right, it is unknown if the 
migrant workers in question here were repatriated without being arrested. 
However, the workers were given consular access, which is required under 
the UN Migration Convention and ASEAN Declaration (the latter also speaks 
of ‘access to justice’, but this is left to the state to prescribe). The relevant 
consulate would presumably have arranged for any necessary legal 
representation, and/or would have looked into the needs of its people up until 
the point they returned home. In a sense, this may be an acceptable 
                                                 
90
  Section 33(4) of the Immigration Act does say, however, that any appeal made under s 33(2) does 
not operate as a stay of execution of any order made under s 33(1). 
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compromise between ensuring that the migrant worker has some form of 
legal assistance (which is guaranteed under the ICCPR as well – but only if 
there is prosecution) and the state having some administrative flexibility. 
 
5. There is no issue of discrimination or unequal treatment either under 
Singapore law or the UN Migration Convention, because all that is needed is 
that the treatment of migrant workers should not be unequal vis-à-vis other 
migrant workers in the country in question, rather than vis-à-vis nationals of 
the country in question. There is nothing to suggest that the migrant workers 
in question had been repatriated without incriminating evidence of their 
participation in the riot; on the contrary, the fact that the majority of suspects 
were only issued advisories would suggest that any prosecutorial and 
repatriation decisions were based on the strength of the evidence gathered. 
The ensuring of non-discrimination can perhaps also be considered as another 
layer to the due process accorded to migrant workers. 
 
6. The use of stern warnings introduces a not insignificant wrinkle in the 
foregoing analysis, in that these could have been offered as a ‘trade-off’ of 
sorts: the migrant workers in question would not be prosecuted, but they 
would have to accept the terms of the warning and be subject to (presumably 
immediate) repatriation. Accepting the stern warnings could conceivably 
render any issues relating to legal representation, the availability of review 
and judicial review, and even whether a person who has been acquitted can 
be repatriated academic.
91
 It could also complicate the analysis as to whether 
sufficient reasons were furnished to the migrant workers (let alone furnished 
to the public) to justify their repatriations, though one may argue that this is 
not strictly required even under current international law standards. 
 
All in all, it is evident that Singapore (the Executive, specifically) is given 
considerable latitude to decide what is best for its own interests under both the 
domestic and international legal frameworks.
92
 Perhaps this should not be surprising, 
in so far as there simply is no right to enter and consequently, no right to stay in a 
country if the state has a reason that removes the privilege to be in the country.
93
 
Developed nations facing constant influxes of migrant workers all over the world are 
probably united on this. Issues relating to immigration – and inevitably, economic 
growth – would always be intertwined with the prevailing economic and political 
climate.
94
 Such climate, however, has had a longstanding aversion to an over-liberal 
immigration policy, and the citizen and government viewpoint will likely be insular 
for some time. In Singapore’s case, the 2013 White Paper that recommended that the 
                                                 
91
  What has not been mentioned thus far is that international law only provides for a very threadbare 
conception of the right to presumption of innocence. For instance, under art 14(2) of the ICCPR, 
all that is stated is that ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.’ 
92
  Perhaps this may even be interpreted as some version of the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
93
  See also P Daway and R P Salvador, ‘Migrant Workers’ Rights and Status under International 
Law: The Asian Experience’ (2010) 3(2) Journal of East Asia and International Law 263. 
94
  See generally J Niessen and S Hune, ‘Ratifying the UN Migrant Workers Convention: Current 
Difficulties and Prospects’ (1994) 12(4) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 393. 
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current population be expanded to 6.9 million people by 2030 – with a sizeable 
minority constituting foreigners – has probably made the issue of the treatment of 
foreigners an even more polarising one than before, rendering it more difficult for 
rational and disinterested analysis.
95
 
 
Thus, while no one would be challenging the existence and applicability of the basic 
and core human rights of migrant workers, whether the state can, in this globalised 
age of mass migrant movement, repatriate them at will and also with minimal 
impediment is a different question altogether, notwithstanding increasing attempts by 
human rights advocates to reframe the discourse.
96
 It would seem that the best 
argument proponents of a right for migrants to resist repatriation can make is that 
there should be greater due process, rather than that current international practices 
provide greater due process than the Singapore regime (it may also be possible to 
make some argument along the lines of general disproportionality, but finding a 
concrete legal basis for this particular context may be elusive). That being the case, 
the outcry from certain quarters in the wake of the Little India riot should not have 
been predicated on the legality of the current regime in Singapore for migrant 
workers who are repatriated without judicial process. Perhaps this is all the more so 
when the primary competing consideration, for the Little India riot at least, was that 
of public safety and security, even if one takes the view that the riot may have 
created a visceral effect on the populace.  
 
Be that as it may, an angle worth exploring in the future will be the use (and 
acceptance) of stern warnings as a means to perhaps characterise the migrant workers 
that were to be repatriated with some kind of guilt (admittedly not in the sense of 
attracting legal consequence upon conviction) so as to justify their departure. For 
one, if the stern warnings were issued here on the basis of lack of evidence (rather 
than say, prosecutorial compassion), how does one know if the lack of evidence is or 
is not to the extent that the authorities might have gotten the wrong person to begin 
with? Is the current appellate mechanism enough? For another, local jurisprudence 
informs us that the effect of stern warnings is that they may actually be considered as 
criminal antecedents used to enhance sentencing.
97
 It is therefore as bad as having a 
criminal record. Although there is probably no chance that migrant workers 
repatriated from Singapore (for whatever reason) will ever get to return, they will 
nevertheless go home with a de facto, if not de jure criminal record. This will 
potentially damage their social and economic prospects even back home, and this 
alone is worth thinking about. Indeed, in the context of migrant workers, nothing will 
quite affect them as much as a swift deportation or repatriation – in a sense it is the 
most important protection they should have. In one fell swoop, this vulnerable group 
                                                 
95
  E Tan, ‘Little India Riot: The Dog that did not Bark’ Today (Singapore, 31 December 2013) 
<http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/little-india-riot-dog-did-not-bark> accessed 31 October 
2014. 
96
  See generally J Fudge, ‘Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment: The Paradox of 
International Rights for Migrant Workers’ (2012) 34(1) Comparative Labour Law & Policy 
Journal 95. 
97
  See note 48 above. 
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of individuals can lose their livelihood and a home, and possibly go away with a 
criminal record. However, current international law standards do not reflect this. 
